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punitive damages. Furthermore, a plaintiff cannot bring an action by virtue
of the amended statute, section 9 of title 23, because a plaintiff may not
bring a cause of action for punitive damages in Oklahoma. A retrospective
interpretation of the Oklahoma Tort Reform Amendment, therefore, seems
to be supported both by common law rules of statutory interpretation and by
the Oklahoma constitution.
Ray D. Weston, Jr.
Uniform Commercial Code: Disclaiming the Express
Warranty in Computer Contracts-Taking the Byte
Out of the UCC
The law's struggle to absorb an emerging industry into existing and well-
defined legal theories is nowhere so dramatic as in the computer industry.
The industry's explosive development, characterized by frequent and abrupt
changes, presents an extraordinary challenge to computer scientists and com-
panies competing to stay abreast of technological innovations and attendant
market adaptations. Consequently, the judicial arena's inherent sluggishness
in adapting to economic developments stands out more than in the past when
it slowly and deliberately responded to the emergence of autos, airplanes, or
televisions.
Contract claims arising from transfers and sales of computer systems are
not decided on a clean slate,' but with reference to the general common law
of contracts and specifically to the Uniform Commercial Code (UCC or
Code). The UCC was drafted with a particular emphasis on adapting legal
rules to commercial developments, and many of the provisions reflect its
basic policy that commercial law should be "non-technical." 2
The UCC places primary importance on (1) simplifying the law governing
commercial transactions, (2) allowing the law to develop alongside changes in
commerce and industry standards, and (3) achieving uniformity in the law
among the states.3 The second objective is crucial to a rapidly developing in-
dustry if legal rulings are to provide meaningful guides to business behavior.
The Code tries to ensure recognition of and respect for various commercial
practices by emphasizing custom, usage of trade, course of dealing (precon-
1. A computer system typically has three components: "the hardware, the data and the
software. The hardware is the machine, the actual computer. The data is the information to be
processed .... The software is the computer program that tells the machine what to do with the
data." Note, Negligence Liability for Defective Software, 33 OKLA. L. REv. 848 (1980).
2. J. WHITE & R. SUMMERS, UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE 15 (2d ed. 1980).
3. U.C.C. § 1-102 (1982).
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tract behavior), course of performance (postcontract behavior), and, in par-
ticular, individual agreement between the parties, throughout its provisions
on contract formation.' The Code also mandates that to further its underly-
ing policies the specific provisions should be "liberally construed.",
Computer systems litigation surfaced at about the same time that many
states were adopting the UCC. By the mid-1960s, computers were finding
their way into the commercial market on a wide scale, primarily as a result of
technological advances that made the computer a useful tool in the office.
Before this stage, computers were generally used only by government agen-
cies and large corporations because of their high cost and immense size.6 The
adaptation of the transistor to computers, which reduced their size and in-
creased their sDeed, was responsible for the production of so-called "second-
generation" computers. The third generation followed the development of
the integrated circuit,7 which allowed further significant reductions in cost
and size while still increasing speed and memory capacities of the computer.
Demand for computer equipment and services from businesses of all sizes as
well as by individuals has since surged dramatically. Selling or leasing com-
puter equipment and designing or programming systems has become a major
growth industry in the country, causing a proportionate rise in litigation in
the field.
This note first examines the extent to which courts have applied or declined
to apply the UCC's article 2 to computer systems transactions. These cases
usually involve a commercial purchase or lease from a computer supplier or a
contract for computer services, such as accounting or other data-processing
services. The second part of this note focuses on the creation of express war-
ranties under article 2 and the tendency of courts to allow effective
disclaimers of these warranties in computer-related cases. This note questions
the wisdom of allowing disclaimers to eliminate express warranties-a
phenomenon peculiar to recent computer litigation that contrasts sharply with
a majority of other UCC cases, with many authorities on commercial law,
and with Code policy.
Applying UCC Article 2 to Computer Contracts
The Early Computer as a "Good"
Article 2 of the UCC governs "transactions in goods"' and declares that
4. R. NORDSTROM, J. MURRAY & A. CLOVIS, SALES: PROBLEMS AND MATERIALS 28 (1982).
5. U.C.C. § 1-102(1) (1982).
6. The earliest first-generation computers consisted of thousands of vacuum tubes, requir-
ing huge amounts of power to operate and almost entire buildings or floors to house them. For
example, one of the best-known early computers, the ENIAC, had 18,000 tubes, weighed 30 tons
and required 15,0C0 square feet of space. Chandler, Computer Transactions: Potential Liability
of Computer User and Vendors, 1977 WASH. U.L.Q. 405, 409.
7. An integrated circuit incorporates the complete electronic circuit on a single encapsulated
chip, whereas circuit boards have their components attached as separate parts. Chandler, supra
note 6, at 409.
8. U.C.C. § 2-102 (1982).
[Vol. 40
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'[g]oods' means all things... which are moveable at the time of identifica-
tion to the contract for sale." 9 The Code expressly excludes (1) money (if
used in payment), (2) investment securities, and (3) things in action.' 0 While
"things" is not a defined term in the Code, common law interpretations and
the law merchant (from which article 2 was derived)" add some flesh to the
concept. Under pre-Code law, only those items that were capable of delivery
or that could be the subject of larceny could be the subject of sales,' 2 thus
distinguishing them from personal rights or other "intangibles. '"' Although
the Code's definition of goods as "moveable things" would by its terms
preclude realty, services, and employment contracts from coming within its
scope, courts have nevertheless invoked Code provisions in some of these
cases, particularly its warranty provisions.' 4 The Code itself also invites
reference to its principles and rules as guidelines for cases not within its
scope.' 5
The identity of the early computer as a single unit and as a "computing
machine" precluded any debate on the applicability of article 2 to commer-
cial transactions involving computers. Thus, where a specially manufactured
computer promising to use "all the latest technological advances" was never
delivered because of the manufacturer's inability to overcome "basic
engineering difficulties," the Code's "practical impossibility" excuse provi-
sion" governed the dispute."' On the other hand, where a transaction has no
tangible elements, such as a contract to perform data-processing services,
courts have rejected article 2 and applied general contract law.' 8 The vast ma-
9. Id. § 2-105.
10. Id. •
11. The law merchant governed the sale of merchandise by merchants and was determined by
merchants' own customs, not judges. Before the common law courts in England expanded into
commercial cases, independent courts exercised jurisdiction over commercial cases in which a
jury of merchants declared the law. When common law courts began invading the area, the
customs of the law merchant were gradually accepted into testimony. Under Lord Mansfield,
many customs were transformed into legal precedents because he used a body of merchants to
advise him in controversies involving merchants. E. FARNSWORTH & J. HONNOLD, COMMERCIAL
LAW (4th ed. 1985).
12. See Note, Computer Software as a Good Under the Uniform Commercial Code: Taking
a Byte Out of the Intangibility Myth, 65 B.U.L. REV. 129, 137 (1985).
13. Id.
14. See generally R. NORDSTROM, J. MURRAY & A. CLOVIS, supra note 4, at 16.
15. U.C.C. § 2-313 comment 2 suggests: "ITihe warranty sections of this Article are not
designed in any way to disturb those lines of case law growth which have recognized that warran-
ties need not be confined either to sales contracts or to the direct parties to such a contract." Cf.
id. § 2-105 comment I (inviting article 2 application by analogy to investment securities in ap-
propriate cases).
16. Id. § 2-615 (excuse by failure of presupposed conditions).
17. See, e.g., United States v. Wegematic Corp., 360 F.2d 674 (2d Cir. 1966).
18. For example, the court in Computer Servicecenters, Inc. v. Beacon Mfg. Co., 328 F.
Supp. 653, 655 (D.S.C. 1970), aff'd, 443 F.2d 906 (4th Cir. 1971), claimed it would "strain the
imagination" to claim that a contract for the analysis, collection, storage, and reporting of data
involves "goods."
19871
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jority of commercial transactions involving the acquisition of computer
systems include both hardware and software or services.
Computer Components: The Dual Nature of Software as a "Good"
or "Service"
The hardware component of a computer system clearly falls within the
literal scope of "goods" as defined by article 2, but computer software does
not comfortably fit into legal classifications separating tangibles from intan-
gibles. A computer program is physically embodied in a tangible medium,
such as a disc, but the program itself is a set of instructions readable by the
machine. Software's resemblance to services created some uncertainty as to
the applicability of article 2 to software transactions, especially when it
became apparent that software could exist and be transferred outside the
"machine." Computer programs no longer had to be "hard-wired" into the
machine's circuitry. Software businesses today compete alongside hardware
suppliers in selling computer programs. Traditional rules of construction,
however, exclude service contracts from article 2,' 9 raising the possibility that
different laws could govern similar transactions depending on the nature of
the seller.
In the initial stages of computerization, most computer contracts involved
"hybrid" transactions where the same vendor supplied both the hardware
and programming services. The courts have almost unanimously applied ar-
ticle 2 in these cases, reaching this determination through a variety of
methods: by the "dominant" factor analysis, 20 by applying Code principles
by analogy," by applying article 2 without discussion, " or by agreement of
the parties.2"
19. La Rossa v. Scientific Design Co., 402 F.2d 937 (3d Cir. 1968) (sales law does not apply
to a contract to build a factory); Perlmutter v. Beth David Hosp., 308 N.Y. 100, 123 N.E.2d 792
(1954) (provision of blood is a contract for services and not governed by the law of sales).
Deficient performance under service contracts is usually governed by a professional malprac-
tice standard under tort law. See Note, The Warranty of Merchantability and Computer Soft-
ware Contracts: A Square Peg Won't Fit in a Round Hole, 59 WASH. L. REv. 511, 526 (1984).
20. In many hybrid transactions, the equipment "dominates," thus making article 2 ap-
plicable to the entire contract. See, e.g., Triangle Underwriters, Inc. v. Honeywell, Inc., 604
F.2d 737 (2d Cir. 1979) (contract for the purchase of a "turn-key" system will be governed by
the statute of limitations for the sale of goods but not for service contracts because service is
"incidental or collateral" to the sale of goods); Carl Beasley Ford v. Burroughs Corp., 361 F.
Supp. 325 (E.D. Pa. 1973) (UCC governs entire transaction where contract price is fixed
regardless of programming services). The frequent practice of "bundling"-charging one price
for computer systems without regard to whether the purchaser wanted accompanying services or
programming by the vendor-was later discontinued because of antitrust implications.
21. Samuel Black Co. v. Burroughs Corp., 33 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 954 (D. Mass.
1981).
22. Computerized Radiological Servs. v. Syntex Corp., 595 F. Supp. 1495 (E.D.N.Y. 1984);
Jaskey Fin. & Leaing v. Display Data Corp., 564 F. Supp. 160 (E.D. Pa. 1983); Bruffey Contr.
[Vol. 40
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In most cases involving software components, the courts simply do not
address the software portion of the transaction separately. So far, few
reported cases involve "pure" software contracts.2" The determination of
whether software is a "good" for purposes of the UCC depends on how it
manifests itself. Where software can be delivered independently (in the form
of floppy discs or magnetic tape), it is treated as a good; 25 where program-
mers operate directly on the computer, the transaction is often considered a
service contract.26 This is at best a rough approximation of the current state
of case law involving software. At least one court determined that the Code's
provision on damages governed what was ostensibly a service-failure to in-
ternally program a computer; but, in that case the service accompanied the
sale of the system.2
Some commentators advocate classifying software as a good by comparing
it to phonograph records, books, or cassette tapes, 28 or because it appears as
an independent "product." 29 Upon closer analysis, the purchase of software
is essentially a contract for an intangible set of instructions constituting an
idea in the same way that consumers buy records for the music recorded
upon them .3  A purchaser may own the phonograph but certainly not the
music. In the computer context, a purchaser can own the physical medium
Co. v. Burroughs Corp., 522 F. Supp. 769 (D. Md. 1981), aff'd, 681 F.2d 812 (4th Cir. 1982);
Garden State Food Distrs. v. Sperry Rand Corp., 512 F. Supp. 975 (D.N.J. 1981); APLications,
Inc. v. Hewlett-Packard Co., 501 F. Supp. 129 (S.D.N.Y. 1980), aff'd, 672 F.2d 1076 (2d Cir.
1982); Hi Neighbor Enters., Inc. v. Burroughs Corp., 492 F. Supp. 823 (N.D. Fla. 1980); Badger
Bearing Co. v. Burroughs Corp., 444 F. Supp. 919 (E.D. Wis. 1977), aff'd, 588 F.2d 838 (7th
Cir. 1978); Kalil Bottling Co. v. Burroughs Corp., 127 Ariz. 278, 619 P.2d 1055 (1980); Bur-
roughs Corp. v. Joseph Uram Jewelers, Inc., 305 So. 2d 215 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1975); Red-
mac, Inc. v. Computerland, 140 Ill. App. 3d 741, 489 N.E.2d 380 (1986); Burroughs Corp. v.
Chesapeake Pet. & Supply Co., 282 Md. 406, 384 A.2d 734 (1978); Westfield Chem. Corp. v.
Burroughs Corp., 21 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 1293 (Mass. Dist. Ct. 1977).
23. Chatlos Sys. v. National Cash Reg. Corp., 635 F.2d 1081 (3d Cir. 1980); Office Supply
Co. v. Basic/Four Corp., 538 F. Supp. 776 (E.D. Wis. 1982); W.R. Weaver Co. v. Burroughs
Corp., 589 S.W.2d 76 (Tex. Ct. App. 1979).
24. Beacon Mfg., 328 F. Supp. at 655; Basic/Four Corp., 538 F. Supp. at 788; Samuel Black
Co., 33 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) at 959.
25. Basic/Four Corp., 538 F. Supp. at 780.
26. Beacon Mfg., 328 F. Supp. at 655.
27. Joseph Uram Jewelers, 305 So. 2d at 215.
28. Note, Computer Programs as Goods under the U.C.C., 77 MICH. L. REv. 1149, 1155
(1979).
29. Note, supra note 12, 65 B.U.L. REv. at 161.
30. See Note, supra note 19, 59 WASH. L. REV. 511.
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upon which a computer program is engrafted, but the intangible aspect of the
program remains the intellectual property of the programmer or publisher.
The user is merely "licensed" to use the program, but prohibited from copy-
ing or otherwise distributing it.
Despite its abstract nature, a computer program may nevertheless readily
lend itself to the concept of a "good" under the UCC because it is extremely
performance- or result-oriented. The essential difference between most com-
mercial computer software and other types of intellectual property is that
with software the result or performance is predictable and measurable in
quantitative, and qualitative terms, whereas other forms of intellectual prop-
erty embodied in tangible media (music, art, literature) cannot be measured
except by entirely subjective criteria. Perhaps the clearest description of the
purchaser's goal in the acquisition of software is the "product [end-result]
after applying or using an idea." ' 3' Unlike a book, software must first inter-
act with the hardware to render desired results.
The concept of software as a good for UCC purposes resembles analyzing
it as a "product" for purposes of tort liability. The less it appears in the
distribution chain and the closer it approaches "custom-tailoring," the more
it is treated as a "service," in contrast to "canned" software which can be
bought off the shelf by virtue of mass production and an extensive distribu-
tion system.
32
Despite the ambivalent nature of computer software regarding its
tangible/intangible status, it is unlikely that general acceptance of it as a
good will be controversial. One reason is that vendors package and sell soft-
ware on the assumption that the law will treat it as a good. Standard clauses
in software licensing agreements on prepackaged programs are phrased in
article 2 warranty, disclaimer, and limitation of liability terms.33
31. In Triangle Underwriters v. Honeywell, Inc., 457 F. Supp. 765, 769 (E.D.N.Y. 1978),
modified, 604 F.2d 737 (2d Cir. 1979), the court said:
Although the ideas or concepts involved in the custom designed software remained
Honeywell's intellectual property, Triangle was purchasing the product of those
concepts. That product required efforts to produce, but it was a product never-
theless and, though intangible, is more readily characterized as "goods" than "ser-
vices." Intangibles may be "goods" within the meaning of U.C.C. § 2-106.
(Emphasis added.)
32. Note, supra note 1, 33 OKLA. L. REV. at 854.
33. For example, IBM's 2.1 DOS (disk operating system) program License Agreement reads:
LIMITED WARRANTY: THE PROGRAM IS PROVIDED "AS IS" WITHOUT
WARRANTY OF ANY KIND, EITHER EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED, IN-
CLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MER-
CHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. THE EN-
TIRE RISK AS TO THE QUALITY AND PERFORMANCE OF THE PRO-
GRAM IS WITH YOU. SHOULD THE PROGRAM PROVE DEFECTIVE,
YOU ... ASSUME THE ENTIRE COST OF ALL NECESSARY SERVICING,
REPAIR OR CORRECTION .... IBM does not warrant that the functions con-
tained in the program will meet your requirements or that the operation of the pro-
gram will be uninterrupted or error-free. However, IBM warrants the diskette(s) or
476 [Vol. 40
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The "Sale" Requirement-Exclusion of Leases and Other Nonsale
Transactions from Article 2
Article 2 requires not only that there be a "good" but also a
"transaction. ' 3 Conceivably, this term is sufficiently broad to encompass
situations beyond "sales," such as leases or bailments involving goods. 35
However, the principal warranty provisions supplying causes of action are
phrased in terms of "buyer" and "seller" and suggest that a "sale" is re-
quired for article 2 coverage. Because "sale" is defined as the "passing of
title from seller to buyer for a price, ' 36 many transactions are technically
outside the ambit of article 2. Nevertheless, the Code may view a lease as a
"contract for sale" in which the seller retains a security interest.37 Many
equipment sales that are structured as leases would fall under this provision.
Furthermore, lease transactions may eventually be governed by the pro-
posed lease article of the UCC because it can be expected that the states will
adopt it as they have the other articles of the Code. 8 The proposed lease ar-
ticle provides that the manufacturer's or supplier's warranties pass through
to the ultimate lessee and thus creates a cause of action against the supplier in
the case of a finance lease. 39 The definition of a finance lease encompasses
the situation where the lessor is essentially acting as the buyer's lender." ° In
the case of true leases, where the lessor retains ownership at the end of the
lease term, warranties are created between the lessor and lessee in basically
the same manner as under the sales article.4'
Until the states adopt the proposed lease article, however, some courts may
refuse to apply article 2 to a computer lease. Vendors who want to escape the
Code's liberal creation of warranties, or whose disclaimers are technically in-
sufficient under the Code, could use the lease as a shield to ward off applica-
cassettes on which the program is furnished, to be free from defects in materials
and workmanship under normal use for a period of ninety (90) days from the date
of delivery to you .... LIMITATIONS OF REMEDIES: IBM's entire liability
and your exclusive remedy shall be: 1. the replacement of any diskette .... 2. if
IBM or the dealer is unable to deliver a replacement diskette or cassette which is
free of defects ... you may terminate this Agreement.
34. U.C.C. § 2-102 (1982).
35. Certain types of bailments, such as those to a carrier for transportation and those to
warehousemen for storage, are specifically dealt with under U.C.C. article 7.
36. U.C.C. § 2-106(1) (1982).
37. Id. § 1-201(37).
38. See Proposed Amendment to U.C.C., Article 2A-Leases (submitted for approval to the
National Conference of Commissioners of Uniform State Laws, Aug. 1-8, 1986, Boston, Mass.).
39. Proposed U.C.C. § 2A-209 (1986).
40. Id. § 2A-103(g) (1986). This section describes a finance lease as "a lease in which (i) the
lessor does not select ... or supply the goods, (ii) the lessee received a copy of the contract
evidencing the lessor's purchase of the goods ... or (iii) the lessee's approval of the contract
evidencing the lessor's purchase of the goods is a condition to effectiveness of the lease
contract."
41. Id. §§ 2A-210 (express warranty), 2A-212 (implied warranty of merchantability), and
2A-213 (implied warranty of fitness).
1987]
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tion of article 2. Surprisingly, computer vendors have not taken advantage of
this argument, and most courts have not viewed computer leases as a bar to
application of article 2.42 So far, only one court has refused to apply article 2
to a computer system acquisition because the transaction was structured as a
lease.4 3 In another computer lease case, the court expressed surprise because
the defendant supplier did not argue that the plaintiff had no cause of action
under article 2." However, courts often treat leases as installment purchase
contracts and apply article 2 if the lessor is in fact acting as a lender or
finance company. 4"
Creation of Express Warranties Under the UCC
In General: The Three Warranties Relating to Quality
Whether general contract law or article 2 of the UCC will govern a parti-
cular dispute may alter the outcome of a case significantly. There are many
differences between the UCC and the common law, especially with regard to
disclaimers, limitation of remedies, consequential damages, statute of frauds,
and the admissibility of parol evidence.' 6 In particular, with respect to war-
ranties, the applicability of the Code will determine whether a cause of action
even exists.
The Code supplies two implied warranties which arise automatically under
certain conditions unless carefully disclaimed."' For all practical purposes,
implied warranties did not exist under the common law of contracts."' The
42. Earman Oil Co. v. Burroughs Corp., 625 F.2d 1291 (5th Cir. 1980) (the original
understanding between the manufacturer and the plaintiff continues to govern dispute regardless
of whether the arrangement with third party was a true lease or a financing arrangement);
Basic/Four Corp., 538 F. Supp. 776 (E.D. Wis. 1982) (parties agreed that lease of software is
governed by UCC); Garden State Food, 512 F. Supp. 975 (E.D. Wis. 1977) (UCC provisions on
consequential damage limitation governs lease/purchase contract); Badger Bearing, 444 F. Supp.
919 (E.D. Wi. 1977) (original equipment contract was foundation for subsequent lease arrange-
ment with third party and, therefore, UCC disclaimer provisions still apply).
43. W.R. Weaver, 580 S.W.2d 76 (Tex. Civ. App. 1979) (conspicuousness of disclaimer, re-
quired under the UCC, is not necesary in a computer equipment lease).
44. See Kalil Bottling, 619 P.2d at 1057. The court noted that the plaintiff was really a third
party beneficiary of the contract between the manufacturer and the financing company (lessor),
which "bought" the computer system and leased it to the plaintiff. The court expressed doubt
whether any implied warranties extended to the plaintiff. Id.
45. Badger Bearing, 444 F. Supp. at 923.
46. McGoaigal, Application of the Uniform Commercial Code to Software Contracts,
COMP. L. SERV. § 3-3, art. 4 (1978).
47. U.C.C. § 2-314 (1982) supplies the warranty of "merchantability which arises when the
seller is "a merchant as to goods of that kind" and requires that goods be "merchantable."
See infra note 50.
U.C.C. § 2-315 states that an implied warranty of fitness for a particular purpose arises when
the seller "has reason to know of any particular purpose for which the goods are required and
that the buyer is relying on the seller's skill or judgment." It requires that the goods be fit for
that particular purpose. Moreover, the seller need not be a merchant for this warranty to arise.
48. Note, supra note 12, 65 B.U.L. REV. at 141.
[Vol. 40
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Code also transforms almost any statement or conduct concerning the goods
into an express warranty without it being necessary to use words such as
"warrant" or "guarantee," and there is no requirement of intent by the
seller to create a warranty. 9 As a result, an express warranty can arise from
almost any communication, except that certain types of sales talk or mere
opinion ("puffing") will not rise to the level of a warranty.
All three types of warranties are relevant in the acquisition of a computer
system, but the ones most likely to lead to controversy are express warranties
and the implied warranty of fitness for a particular purpose." Any
negotiation-type setting will, over time, raise factual questions as to what was
explicitly claimed. Such a setting will also produce allegations that the seller
knew or was informed as to the vendee's particular wishes and needs and that
the vendee was relying on the seller's superior skill and knowledge. These are
the circumstances that create the implied warranty of fitness for a particular
purpose. Therefore, the seller's statements can raise two different types of
warranties-express warranties and implied warranty of fitness for a parti-
cular purpose.
Modified Reliance in Creating an Express Warranty
Under the Code, express warranties can be created by: (1) any affirmation
of fact or promise relating to the goods, (2) any description of the goods, or
(3) any sample or model." The pre-Code requirement of "reliance" by the
buyer under the Uniform Sales Act and common law52 has been replaced
with the less stringent requirement that the statement or promise become
49. U.C.C. § 2-313 (1982).
50. Disputes involving the implied warranty of merchantability, U.C.C. § 2-314, will usually
be limited to factual questions about the condition of the good. This warranty is fairly
straightforward and assures that goods should: "(a) pass without objection in the trade, and (b)
in the case of fungible goods, be of fair average quality; ... (c) be fit for the ordinary purpose
for which such goods are used."
This warranty certainly covers defects in hardware and defects in the medium upon which
computer programs are stored, such as the defective disc or tape. Conceptually, it is difficult to
extend this particular warranty to the intellectual contents of a program or to its correct logical
sequence in order to assure a particular result. Proof of breach of this implied warranty
necessarily involves comparisons with other "goods." In an industry characterized by rapid
changes and developments, comparisons among different programs to establish what "passes
without objection in the trade" may invite speculation in a courtroom. It may also be a disser-
vice to buyers by setting minimum standards that become outdated in a matter of a few months
or by demanding perfection when such is not feasible. In either case such an approach is not
only inconsistent with the UCC emphasis on conforming the law to the current realities of an in-
dustry, but also could stifle the industry's natural development. Note, supra note 19, 59 WASH.
L. REv. at 525.
51. U.C.C. § 2-316(1)(a)-(c) (1982).
52. The express warranty under common law had almost identical features as the implied
warranty of fitness under the Code. In White v. Miller, 71 N.Y. 118, 129-30 (1877), the well-
known case overruling the extremism of caveat emptor principles, the court said:
A dealer who sells an article, describing it by the name of an article of commerce,
the identity of which is not known to the purchaser, must understand that the
Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 1987
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"part of the basis of the bargain."" Official comments under the express
warranty provision suggest that the seller must demonstrate that the state-
ment or promise did not become part of the understanding between the par-
ties, rather than requiring the buyer to prove his reliance. Exactly how this
burden may be met remains unclear, but presumably a showing that a
buyer's belief or reliance was unreasonable or a showing that the buyer
"knew better" would satisfy this burden. This reasoning reintroduces the
pre-Code reliance element."
The same idea of unreasonable reliance is also inherent in the Code's ex-
clusion of the seller's "opinion" or "commendation of the goods" as an ex-
press warranty. Although some courts claim that reliance is irrelevant to the
existence of an express warranty, 6 it is conceptually difficult to entirely
disregard reliance in determining which statements are part of the basis of the
bargain or in identifying a seller's "opinion."
Computer-related cases decided under the UCC have also used a reliance
factor in determining the creation of express warranties. In Westfield
Chemical Corp. v. Burroughs Corp.,-" the court used a reliance-type test to
determine whether an express warranty was created by the seller when a
salesman assured the buyer during negotiations for a computer system that it
would realize "substantial man-hour savings." 8 In concluding that no ex-
press warranty was created by the affirmation, the court said:
[M]an-hour savings are dependent upon such variables as the pro-
gram actually decided upon, the cooperation and efficiency of the
operators, the caliber of electric current supplied to the computer,
the volume of business being processed, etc., none of which were
susceptible of knowledge when the proposal was written.... Fur-
latter relies upon the description as a representation by the seller that it is the thing
described; and this constitutes a warranty.
As reported in R. NORDSTROM, J. MURRAY & A. CLOVIS, supra note 4, at 110 (emphasis added).
53. U.C.C. § 2-313(1) (1982).
54. Comment 3 to U.C.C. § 2-313 states:
In actual practice affirmations of fact made by the seller about the goods during a
bargain are regarded as part of the description of those goods; hence no particular
reliance on such statements need be shown in order to weave them into the fabric
of the agreement. Rather, any fact which is to take such affirmations, once made,
out of the agreement requires clear affirmative proof.
See also J. WHITE & R. SUMMERS, supra note 2, § 9-5.
55. See id.
56. In Ewers v. Eisenzopf, 88 Wis. 2d 482, 489, 276 N.W.2d 802, 805 (1979), the court sug-
gested that reliance is irrelevant under the Code and that the "true test" of the existence of an
express warranty is "whether [the seller] made an affirmation of fact the natural tendency of
which was to induce the sale and which did in fact induce it." (Citing Pritchard v. Liggett &
Meyers Tobacco Co., 350 F.2d 479, 487 (3d Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 987 (1966)).
Arguably, the difference between an affirmation upon which a buyer relies and one which in-
duces a purchase is slight, if a difference exists at all.
57. 21 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 1293 (Mass. Dist. Ct. 1977).
58. Id. at 1297.
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thermore, as a matter of law, the plaintiff could not have
reasonably relied upon such representations."
Curiously, the court supported its conclusion by commenting that
statements made during the early planning stages are less conducive to
reasonable reliance. 6 However, traditional reliance concepts necessarily
assume that this is precisely when those warranties are created because of the
"inducement" factor. In fact, the Code intended to enlarge the scope of ex-
press warranties by allowing statements made after the contract to operate as
warranties, even though, logically, the buyer could not rely on postcontrac-
tual statements in making a purchase decision."
A reliance test was also used in Investors Premium Corp. v. Burroughs
Corp.'2 to deny recovery on a seller's statement that the computer "had suf-
ficient capacity and capability to handle [buyer's] then present business needs
and to double that capacity without adding additional personnel.' 6 3 The
buyer, however, had leased the system before signing a purchase agreement
and apparently knew that the system was incapable of performing in con-
formity with those affirmations. After examining the circumstances and com-
munications prior to the signing of the purchase contract, the court deter-
mined that in fact no reliance occurred because of the buyer's actual
knowledge of the system's performance capacity. 6' The court then declared
that the prior assurances were excluded from being considered in evidence
because of the Code's parol evidence rule. 65 The court's decision is somewhat
confusing because it considered extrinsic evidence to rule out reliance as a
basis for an express warranty, but it then proceeded to exclude the same ex-
trinsic evidence for purposes of proving the content of the assurances.
General and Specific Statements-The Express Warranty as the
Sum of its Parts
Express warranties can also be created by advertisements or brochures,"
prior proposals, or letters, although these more easily approach puffing than
59. Id. at 1297-98 (emphasis added).
60. Id. at 1298.
61. Comment 7 to U.C.C § 2-313 states: "The precise time when words of description or af-
firmation are made.., is not material.... If language is used after the closing of the deal ....
the warranty becomes a modification, and need not be supported by consideration if it is other-
wise reasonable and in order."
62. 389 F. Supp. 39 (D.S.C. 1974).
63. Id. at 44.
64. Id.
65. U.C.C. § 2-202 (1982).
66. Computerized Radiological Servs., Inc., v. Syntex Corp., 595 F. Supp. 1495 (E.D.N.Y.
1984) (express warranty can be found in sales literature, brochures, and ads); Jaskey Fin. &
Leasing v. Display Data Corp., 564 F. Supp. 160 (E.D. Pa. 1983) (advertising and promotional
materials claiming system to be: (1) a "turn-key" system particularly suitable for use by an
automobile dealership, and (2) a system in which all errors and malfunctions would be
eliminated in specified time, were express warranties susceptible to exclusion by parol evidence
19871
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specific oral statements. 67 Generally, the more specific the assertion or state-
ment, the closer it comes to being considered a warranty rather than puffing
or opinion. The degree of specificity needed to create an express warranty,
however, does not necessarily require an inordinate amount of detail; phrases
such as "an effective tool" or "suitable for business expansion" have been
considered sufficient to embody an express warranty. 68
However, an overall general idea or concept (as opposed to mere
vagueness) created by the cumulative effect of individual specific statements,
or by a series of conduct may constitute an overall express warranty, which
exists apart from the "mini-warranties" of individual parts of a good. For
example, a promise to provide a "turn-key" system69 can be created by
assurances that the buyer's employees would be trained to operate the com-
puters in conjunction with the sale of computer equipment.7 0 Similarly, an
Illinois court concluded that a seller's oral statements that a computer system
would be "free of defects" upon delivery or be repaired during a 90-day war-
ranty period and would "work for a reasonable period of time" could not be
classified as puffing. ' Instead, the cumulative effect of these representations
constituted a warranty that the equipment "would operate properly; and, in
the event it did not, [seller] promised to render it operational for a reasonable
period of time."
7
2
A "cumulative-type" warranty approach was also taken by a federal
district court in Pennsylvania. 73 It viewed an oral promise to provide pro-
grams along with the sale of computer equipment as the equivalent of a war-
rule); APLication;, Inc. v. Hewlett-Packard Co., 501 F. Supp. 129 (S.D.N.Y. 1980), aff'd, 672
F.2d 1076 (2d Cir. 1982) (general representation to the industry in a brochure that the APL/300
computer language system would provide "fast response even with multiple users" was an ex-
press warranty).
67. Garden State Food Distrib., Inc. v. Sperry Rand Corp., 512 F. Supp. 975 (D.N.J. 1981)
(seller admitted that series of letters to the plaintiff created express warranties).
68. See generally J. WHrra & R. SUMMERS, supra note 2, § 9-3. See also Clements Auto Co.
v. Service Bureau Corp., 444 F.2d 169 (8th Cir. 1971). The court found the statement that a
data-processing system would, "when, fully -implemented, be capable of providing [the buyer]
sufficient information in a form such ... that it would constitute an effective and efficient tool
to be used in inventory control" actionable in a cause for misrepresentation. Id. 178-84. The
dispute arose prior to Minnesota's adoption of the UCC. The court found that under state law,
no scienter or intent was necessary in an action for misrepresentation. Id. at 176. The court in-
dicated that the statement would have created a warranty under the UCC as well. Id.
See also Dunn Appraisal Co. v. Honeywell Information Sys., Inc., 687 F.2d 877 (6th Cir.
1982) (representation that computer would be suitable for intended use in business expansion
was not an "opinion" but a statement of present fact).
69. A system xhich is complete and fully operational by the delivery or contract date.
70. See Triangle Underwriters, Inc. v. Honeywell, Inc., 457 F. Supp. 765 (E.D.N.Y. 1978)
(the concept of a ,ystem that is capable of performance as soon as installed is itself a warranty
that is breached on delivery, not a warranty that extends to future performance for purposes of
determining when the statute of limitations begins to run).
71. Redmac, Inc. v. Computerland, 140 II1. App. 3d 741, 489 N.E.2d 380 (1986).
72. Id., 489 N.E.2d at 383.
73. Carl Beasley Ford, Inc. v. Burroughs Corp., 361 F. Supp. 325 (E.D. Pa. 1973).
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ranty to provide functioning equipment, rather than merely equipment as
provided in the written sales contract. Although technically only the oral con-
tract was breached when the programming proved deficient, the court viewed
both agreements as inseparable because the hardware was "virtually worth-
less" without proper programming. 4 Therefore, the court allowed the plain-
tiff to recover under the terms of the written equipment sales contract
because only it provided a price for measuring damages.
Liberal construction of warranties raises the possibility that generic-type
expressions alone may create express warranties upon which a vendee can
sue-much like the term "automobile" denotes a warranty that the car will
perform to some degree, such as providing transportation for at least some
distance.7 5 Presumably, as computer terms become more deeply rooted in our
daily language, phrases such as "accounting program," "word-processing
program," or "turn-key system" will carry with them specific expected stan-
dards of performance. The Code contemplates that such "warranties of
description" are express warranties rather than implied,7" a designation that
becomes significant because of the difference in their respective disclaimabil-
ity."
Proving a Breach of Express Warranty
Although the Code provides for the relatively uncomplicated creation of
express warranties through conduct, description, or samples, the computer
vendee will often encounter serious impediments in attempting to prove that
a particular malfunction or error constitutes a breach of warranty. Consumer
demand for compatibility between printers, terminals, software, and other
computer products will complicate pinpointing the source of a problem.
Because the buyer must show that a deficiency comes within the seller's realm
of responsibility, the buyer may have to show a connection between a certain
deficiency and a breach of warranty, rather than simply showing the faulty
performance.
This problem arose in Bruffey Contracting Co. v. Burroughs Corp. ,78
where the buyer failed to convince the trial court that a recurring printer
74. Id. at 334.
75. J. WHITE & R. SUMMERS, supra note 2, at § 9-3. See also R. NORDSTROM, SALES 64
(1970).
76. Comment 1 to U.C.C. § 2-313 (1982) states: "This section reverts to the older case law
insofar as the warranties of description and sample are designated 'express' rather than
'implied."'
77. Under common law analysis, for example, describing an item as a "car" would imply
that it had a motor, thus creating an implied warranty. Under the Code, however, implied war-
ranties are easily disclaimed by standard clauses and the buyer would have no recourse unless the
existence of the motor became incorporated into the express warranty. The test as to what comes
within such a "generic" or "description" warranty would vary with each fact pattern and be
determined by the understanding of the reasonable buyer. See R. NORDSTROM, supra note 75, at
64.
78. 33 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 1269 (D. Md. 1981).
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malfunction was connected to specific parts warranted by the seller. The
court concluded that the "nature of the system is that no one could say with
certainty in every case what caused a malfunction," 9 and, therefore, placed
the burden of showing general causation (linking the defect to the scope of
the warranty) on the buyer.
On the other hand, in Carl Beasley Ford, Inc. v. Burroughs Corp.,80 the
court held that the plaintiff had satisfied its burden of proof by showing that
it had contracted for a certain result that failed to materialize. The transac-
tion involved the purchase of computer equipment. Although programming
services were part of a separate oral agreement, they were included in the
total purchase price of the equipment. A jury determined that the seller had
promised to provide thirteen computer programs along with the equipment,
that it had failed to deliver most of the programs, and that there were con-
tinuing problems with the programs that were delivered. Specifically, the jury
found that the seller had failed to provide programming adequate to perform
the "functions which had been performed by the [plaintiff's accountants]
and produce the information necessary to preparation and submission of
Ford Financial Reports." 8 ' The defendant argued that although the plaintiff
had shown faulty performance, it failed to demonstrate that any deficiency
was caused by faulty programming rather than by operator error or machine
malfunction. The court responded that the seller had to establish the reason
for the faulty performance if it wished to absolve itself.8" Thus, at a
minimum, the buyer must show nonconforming performance. Whether he
will also be required to show causation at that point and whether the burden
then shifts to the seller to show his nonresponsibility for the faulty perfor-
mance, is not settled.
This precarious balance in the shifting burden of proof is reflected in Red-
mac, Inc. v. Computerland,83 where an Illinois appellate court upheld a trial
court's ruling that the seller had the burden of proving causation of defective
performance once the buyer had shown nonconforming performance.
Although the seller claimed that the buyer had failed to treat the computer
area with antistatic spray and mats as advised and that certain programming
symptoms could only result from operator-tampering, this was not sufficient
to counter plaintiff's showing. However, the court indicated that the defen-
dant could have prevailed by using outside or expert testimony instead of
relying only on his own.84
As users become more sophisticated and are able to modify prepackaged
software or alter computer systems to suit specific needs, the evidentiary pro-
blem of proving causation may become hopelessly confusing. The buyer also
79. Id. at 1276.
80. 361 F. Supp. 325 (E.D. Pa. 1973).
81. Id. at 327.
82. Id. at 331.
83. 140 11. App. 3d 741, 489 N.E.2d 380 (1986).
84. Id., 489 N.E.2d at 383.
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increases his risk if he hires an outside specialist to find or fix any trouble.
This will invariably entail modifications to a system, such as reprogramming,
and possibly create insurmountable barriers to proof in a later suit against a
vendor, unless detailed records are kept. In addition, a seller could justifiably
condition the effectiveness of any warranty on nonmodification. 5 Because
authorities differ on when the burden of proof is satisfied, the buyer should
be prepared to show causation of the faulty performance.
Conditional Effectiveness of the Express Warranty-
Requirements of Privity
One unanswered question is whether a manufacturer can validly condition
the effectiveness of its express warranties on the purchaser buying only from
an "authorized dealer." ' 86 At common law, only the parties to the immediate
contract of sale could sue for warranty relief." This privity of contract re-
quirement has been eroding for a number of years and sometimes has even
been eliminated entirely." The Code has contributed to this erosion by ex-
tending warranties to third parties outside the distribution chain in the case
of personal injury and by providing state legislatures with three alternatives
by which to expand warranty protection to the end user.8 9 As with the ques-
tion of unconscionability, this area is open to court interpretation and
development.
The extension of warranty issue is closely related to the requirement of a
"sale" for article 2 coverage, 90 except that here it is not a question of
whether article 2 governs a "non-sale" transaction, but whether an ultimate
purchaser can benefit from the original supplier's warranties after a series of
sales. If not, his only cause of action is against his immediate seller, who
85. See, e.g., Office Supply Co. v. Basic/Four Corp., 538 F. Supp. 776, 780 (E.D. Wis.
1982) (agreement provided: "If the purchaser, without the written consent of the Seller, makes
any modification to the programming or any deviations from the operating instructions .... all
warranties set forth herein cease immediately.").
86. Some computer manufacturers have announced a war against so-called "gray
marketers" of their equipment. Gray-marketing is when a manufacturer's goods are sold outside
the designated distribution chain at a reduced price. The gray marketer obtains the goods from
the authorized dealer who may have gotten a substantial discount from the manufacturer
because of a large-volume purchase. The authorized dealer is obligated to sell only to end users
but will move more volume and still make a profit by selling to another dealer. The authorized
dealers, however, are under an obligation to provide minimum services on the manufacturer's
warranty to the end users; the gray marketers are not. 195 N.Y.L.J. 46, Mar. 11, 1986, at 1, col.
1.
87. HAWKLAND UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE SERIES § 2-313:09 (1984).
88. Id.
89. U.C.C. § 2-318 (1982). At a minimum, Alternative A extends a warranty to those per-
sons suffering personal injury on account of a breach if they are a family or household members
of the buyer or a guest of the household. Alternative C allows the court to determine the
recovery of any economic damages of any persons who may reasonably be expected to use the
goods.
90. See supra notes 34-45 and accompanying text.
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most probably did not make any independent warranties. Indeed, a pur-
chaser may find it difficult to recover on an express warranty or to get prom-
ised repairs if the manufacturer has clearly imposed an "authorized dealer
only" condition on the product and the purchaser realized he was obtaining
computer equipment at a price substantially lower than retail. Dealers who
promise servicing and are obliged to honor manufacturers' warranties would
be at a disadvantage if they had to perform warranty repairs on a product
not sold by them but by a competitor who has no contractual obligation to
the supplier to perform repairs.
The Vulnerability of the Express Warranty in UCC Computer-Related Cases
The General View of Cases, Commentators, and the Code:
Disclaimers are not Effective Against Express Warranties
The Code clearly disfavors attempts to exclude or disclaim express war-
ranties once made. The 1952 Code draft prohibited a seller from doing just
that by providing: "If the agreement creates an express warranty, words dis-
claiming it are inoperative." 91 Permitting disclaimers of express warranties
would allow sellers to promise the moon to make a sale, while keeping their
fingers crossed to ward off any liability. However, the draft provision was
criticized because it created a problem of construction in that it required the
peculiar interpretation that an express warranty was isolated and existed
apart from the rest of the agreement. This interpretatiQn directly conflicted
with the traditional approach of reading the agreement as a whole.9 2 Thus, a
blanket disclaimer could virtually eliminate the creation of an express war-
ranty and undermine the basic purpose of section 2-316(1).
Section 2-316(1) now reads:
Words or conduct relevant to the creation of an express warranty
and words or conduct tending to negate or limit warranty shall be
construed wherever reasonable as consistent with each other; but
subject to the provisions of this Article on parol or extrinsic
evidence (section 2-202) negation or limitation is inoperative to the
extent that such construction is unreasonable.
91. J. WHITE & R. SUMMERS, supra note 2, § 12-2.
92. Professor John Honnold, writing for the New York Law Revision Commission, stated:
This language ... presents a problem of construction which must be faced at the
outset .... If the agreement is read as a whole and includes a complete disclaimer,
how cani it be supposed that the agreement ever created an express warranty?
However, this view that a disclaimer clause could operate to forestall the creation
of an express warranty under the Code would virtually deny effect to subsection
(1). This provision is patently designed to allow express warranties to override
disclaimer clauses; subsection (1) may not be construed in a fashion to render it in-
operative.
I N.Y.L. REV. COMM. REP. U.C.C. 1955, at 405, 406, as reported in HAWKLAND, supra note 87,
§ 2-316:02.
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The new language does not change the substantive notion of the 1952 draft,
but it recognizes that there is a difference between the simultaneous giving
and withdrawing of an express warranty and not giving a warranty in the
first place. Thus, language in an agreement can be used to show that an ex-
press warranty was never in fact created, but that language may not act as a
disclaimer of a warranty.
One commentator has even suggested that the only way for a seller to be
certain that there are no express warranties is to completely refrain from any
words or conduct relevant to the creation of an express warranty. 9" As
discussed earlier, express warranties are easily created and this advice is con-
sequently difficult to apply.9 ' Accordingly, the seller's option is to show that
any grounds upon which an express warranty rests were withdrawn by him-
an analysis that requires the same proof as showing that no warranty ever
came into being under section 2-313. 9 Such proof would probably consist of
demonstrating that the affirmation did not relate to the goods, that it was
merely an opinion, or that it never became the basis of the bargain. Other
commentators have reached essentially the same conclusion.
96
Comments to section 2-313 on the creation of express warranties echo the
position that disclaiming an express warranty is basically a contradiction in
terms. They provide: "A clause generally disclaiming 'all warranties, express
or implied,' cannot reduce the seller's obligation with respect to such descrip-
tion and therefore cannot be given literal effect under section 2-316
(disclaimer provision)." 97
Any consideration of express warranties, however, is inextricably linked to
the Code's parol evidence provision,9" which can operate to prevent promises
from becoming part of the agreement. The Code language prohibiting ex-
press warranty disclaimers is subject to the Code's parol evidence rule and
reflects the competing objectives at stake: protection of the buyer from
"unexpected and unbargained language' 99 and protection of the seller from
false allegation of earlier oral warranties."'0 Nevertheless, the Code's protec-
tion of express warranties as the "essence of the bargain,"'0 1 supplemented
by its flexible parol provision,' 2 clearly mandate that disclaimers of express
93. R. NORDSTROM, supra note 75, at 87.
94. See supra notes 46-77 and accompanying text.
95. R. NORDSTROM, supra note 75, at 87.
96. J. WHITE & R. SUMMERS, supra note 2, § 12-3. See also HAWKLAND, supra note 87,
2-316:02.
97. U.C.C. § 2-313 comment 4 (1982).
98. Id. § 2-202.
99. Id. § 2-316 comment 1.
100. Id. comment 2.
101. Comment I to U.C.C. § 2-313 states: .'Express' warranties rest on 'dickered' aspects of
the individual bargain, and go so clearly to the essence of that bargain that words of disclaimer
in a form are repugnant to the basic dickered terms."
102. U.C.C. § 2-202 allows a writing intended to be final to be "explained or supplemented"
with evidence of (1) course of dealing, (2) usage of trade, (3) course of performance, and (4) con-
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warranties should not be given effect, particularly if disclaimers are
boilerplate prcvisions.
In keeping with Code policy, courts interpreting the UCC have generally
not allowed disclaimers to operate against written or oral warranties.", In
contrast, courts interpreting the UCC in computer-related cases since the
mid-1970s have taken the opposite position and allowed disclaimers to negate
such warranties. As yet, this interpretation has not spilled over into noncom-
puter cases and remains a characteristic peculiar to the computer group. The
following subsections examine the evolution of the disclaimability of express
warranties in computer-related cases and attempt to explain its development.
The Originating Cases-Still in Line With the General Rule
Three cases seem to be responsible for the phenomenon of express war-
ranty disclaimability in computer-related cases, based on the frequency with
which they have been cited in later cases for this proposition.'04 Two of these
cases are computer-related, 05 but only one of these could fairly be read as
holding that an express warranty may be negated by the seller. However, even
this case rests on two alternative grounds.
In Investors Premium Corp. v. Burroughs Corp.,6 the Federal District
sistent additional terms.'If a court determines that the agreement is intended to be final and ex-
clusive, no evidence of consistent additional terms is allowed,
Comments ecplain that a court may always examine course of dealing, usage of trade, and
course of performance to find the "true understanding" of the parties, including presumably
their intent as to tle exclusiveness of the written agreement. It seems, then, that standard merger
and integration clauses are extremely susceptible to attack because they can only be used as some
evidence of intent; they are not conclusive. In addition, if a court finds the rest of the contract
ambiguous or incomplete, such a merger clause can easily be ignored. See J. WHITE & R. SUM.
MERS, supra note 2, § 12-4.
103. Northern States Power Co. v. ITT Meyer Indus., 777 F.2d 405 (8th Cir. 1985) (a
disclaimer of al'. warranties that conflicts with a specifications warranty is inapplicable); Walcott
& Steele, Inc. v. Carpenter, 246 Ark. 95, 436 S.W.2d 820 (1969) (clause on seller's invoice for
cottonseed was unuuccessful attempt to modify an express warranty on a certificate attached to
the bags); Killion v. Buran Equip. Co., 27 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 970 (Cal. Ct. App.
1979) ("As is" di;claimer on used truck could be construed that truck is sold "as is" and
without warranties except those to which parties expressly agreed); Century Dodge, Inc. v.
Mobley, 155 Ga. App. 712, 272 S.E.2d 502 (1980) (it is unreasonable to allow an express war-
ranty describing car as "new" to be negated by a disclaimer of warranties); Young & Cooper,
Inc. v. Vestring, 214 Kan. 311, 521 P.2d 281 (1974) (UCC allows disclaimer only of implied war-
ranties; express warranties not subject to exclusion or modification); Gladden v. Cadillac Motor
Car Div., 83 N.J. 320, 416 A.2d 394 (1980) (exclusion or limitation engrafted on express warran-
ty is inoperative to extent the terms are unreasonably inconsistent with express warranty); Miller
v. Hubbard-Wray Co., 52 Or. App. 897, 630 P.2d 880 (1981) (once an oral warranty is admissi-
ble, there is no poli:y or law that the oral warranty should be treated differently than any written
warranty; thereforc, an inconsistent disclaimer is ineffective against it).
104. S.M. Wilson & Co. v. Smith Int'l, Inc., 587 F.2d 1363 (9th Cir. 1978); Investors
Premium v. Burroughs Corp., 389 F. Supp. 39 (D.S.C. 1974); Bakal v. Burroughs Corp., 72
Misc. 2d 202, 343 N.Y.S.2d 541 (Sup. Ct. 1972).
105. Of the cases listed in note 104, only S.M. Wilson & Co. was not a computer case. The
warranty there concerned the operating speed of a tunnel-boring machine. 587 F.2d at 1366.
106. 389 F. Supp. 39 (D.S.C. 1979).
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Court for South Carolina found that an express warranty existed in a con-
tract for computer hardware, although the contents of the warranty were
unclear from the opinion. The court recited the contract's disclaimer and in-
tegration clause and concluded: "Such an exclusion is authorized under
[2-316]." ' 0' Since 2-316(1) cross-references the parol evidence provision, it is
difficult to tell whether the court allowed the disclaimer of the express war-
ranty or whether it excluded the statement from evidence under the parol
restriction.
The other computer case, Bakal v. Burroughs Corp.,"O8 allowed a
disclaimer of the implied warranties of merchantability and fitness for a par-
ticular purpose. The court found no breach of a written warranty in the con-
tract covering defects in material or workmanship of the equipment,'0 9 but it
used the parol evidence bar to exclude sales literature and prior oral repre-
sentations from being incorporated into the contract after a determination
that the written contract was the final expression of the parties' intent. 1" 0 All
of the court's conclusions are consistent with Code policy and with the
general approach of warranty cases thereunder.
The noncomputer case, S. M. Wilson & Co. v. Smith International,
Inc.,"' was decided on grounds similar to Bakal. The court in S. M. Wilson
concluded that the Code's parol provision prevented an earlier letter from
becoming part of the contract because of an effective merger clause that
specifically excluded any statements by "unauthorized" representatives." 2
The only reason the buyer could not recover on the remaining warranty was
because of his own misassembly of the machine.' 13
Neither Bakal nor S. M. Wilson actually held that express warranties could
be legally disclaimed, but later computer cases would certainly create that im-
pression by repeated citation to these cases. There are several possible
reasons explaining this development, not the least of which is a general con-
fusion about the nature of express and implied warranties and the difference
in their respective disclaimability.
However, coincidence also plays a part in the phenomenon of express war-
ranty disclaimability in computer cases. A later case, Westfield Chemical
Corp. v. Burroughs Corp.,'' cited both Bakal and Investors Premium to
hold that an express warranty regarding the efficiency and time savings of a
computerized accounting system was effectively disclaimed. Although it is
arguable that the issue in Westfield Chemical was limited to whether an ex-
press warranty ever existed,'" the language of the opinion indicates other-
107. Id. at 45.
108. 343 N.Y.S.2d 541 (1972).
109. Id. at 544.
110. Id. at 545.
111. 587 F.2d 1363 (9th Cir. 1978).
112. Id. at 1371.
113. Id.
114. 21 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 1293 (Mass. Dist. Ct. 1977).
115. The case held that an express warranty was absent because there was no buyer reliance.
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wise. Consequently, the case became a true precedent for court opinions
allowing successful disclaimers of express warranties in computer litigation.
The tendency of UCC opinions to rely on cases involving the same type of
good explains both the relative profusion of express warranty disclaimability
within the computer group and the simultaneous isolation of this
phenomenon to the computer field. A case-by-case analysis of UCC com-
puter litigation reveals that many factors combined to create what is almost
an aberration of previous established law: that no disclaimer is effective once
an express warranty is found to exist. As of now, a majority within the small
cluster of UCC computer cases hold the opposite.
The Express/Implied Warranty Confusion
A major reason for the disclaimability of the express warranty is the lack
of any bright-line distinction between express and implied warranties.", This
type of reasoning is reflected in APLications, Inc. v. Hewlett-Packard Co.," 1
7
where a federal court found that a disclaimer which complied with the re-
quirements for effectively disclaiming the implied warranties of merchant-
ability and fitness for a particular purpose (conspicuous, written, and prop-
erly worded) also negated any express warranty given by the vendor. The
buyer, who was in the business of adapting and reselling computers and soft-
ware, claimed that the manufacturer gave an express warranty regarding a
newly developed computer language that was supposed to diminish response
time in small-scale computers. The manufacturer was undoubtedly aware
that the plaintiff relied on these statements in its own resale to a customer
because the manufacturer's representatives attended a number of meetings
between the plaintiff and the ultimate customer (presumably to explain or
promote the new computer language). The response time of the new system
proved unacceptably long. Nevertheless, satisfied that the disclaimer com-
plied with the Code requirement for disclaiming implied warranties,,' ' the
court determined that the "[a]greement excludes this [express] warranty as
well [as any implied warranty]. While there are no particular requirements
However, the court first found that the language in the disclaimer was effective against "all war-
ranties express and implied." Id. at 1295. See supra notes 57-60 and accompanying text.
116. Although not an explanation of why computer cases specifically allow disclaimers of ex-
press warranties, one general reason for such a position might be that the implied warranties of
merchantability and fitness are relatively easy to disclaim so long as the disclaimers meet the
Code's conspicuousness standards and wording requirements set forth in section 2-316(2) and
(3). The Code's position is that disclaiming these warranties is perfectly proper. Because implied
warranties arise as an operation of law and depend on certain fact patterns (e.g., the implied
warranty of fitness arises only when the seller has reason to know of a particular purpose; the
implied warranty of merchantability arises only if the seller is a merchant as to goods of that
kind), the seller is not attempting to avoid liability for his own conduct or representation during
a transaction, as is the case with express warranties.
117. 501 F. Stipp. 129 (E.D.N.Y. 1980), aff'd, 672 F.2d 1076 (2d Cir. 1982).
118. The disclaimer read: "NO OTHER WARRANTY IS EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED. HP
SPECIFICALLY DISCLAIMS THE IMPLIED WARRANTY OF MERCHANTABILITY
AND FITNESS FOR PARTICULAR PURPOSE." Id. at 132.
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under the Code to limit express warranties or liability, the Code contemplates
that such limitations may be undertaken by the parties."' 1 9 The court
justified its position by citing the previously discussed seminal cases: In-
vestors Premium, S. M. Wilson, Westfield Chemical, and Bakal.
The same logic was also followed in Jaskey Financing & Leasing v. Display
Data Corp.12 There the court held that a conspicuous and properly worded
disclaimer (effective against implied warranties) was sufficient to preclude
oral express warranties.' 2' The court concluded that "cases in other states ap-
plying the Uniform Commercial Code are almost unanimous in holding that
provisions disclaiming express warranties by the use of language similar to
that in this case are effective disclaimers of express warranties."' 22 In con-
trast to Investors Premium,' 23 however, the court explicitly decided that it
was the combined effect of a properly worded disclaimer and integration
clause that prevented the express warranty from being effective, thus basing
its holding on both grounds.
Another curious reading of warranty disclaimers appears in Ellmer v.
Delaware Mini-Computer Systems. 21 In that case, the court interpreted a
statement that the computer was "a first-rate computer and would perform
all the functions necessary to be performed by a commercial computer,"' 2 as
the equivalent of a warranty of merchantability or of fitness. Because the
contract contained a disclaimer that would have been effective against both
of these warranties had they been implied; the court concluded that the
disclaimer operated against the express warranty as well.' 26
The court's conclusion is unsupported by the UCC. The Code does not in-
dicate that a disclaimer should work to eliminate an express warranty simply
because it articulates the contents of an implied warranty. Instead, the UCC
focuses on how warranties are created to distinguish express from implied
119. Id. at 133. The court also cited section 2-719, the Code's provision on limitation of
remedies. However, it specifically relied on section 2-316(1) and on the wording of the disclaimer
to hold that the disclaimer was effective. It seems as though the court equated a limitation of
remedy under section 2-719 with a disclaimer under section 2-316(1). See infra note 157 and ac-
companying text for a discussion of section 2-719.
120. 564 F. Supp. 160 (E.D. Pa. 1983) (discussed earlier for the court's conclusion that an ex-
press warranty existed for a turn-key system particularly suitable for an automobile dealership).
See supra note 69.
121. Id. at 163. The buyer claimed that the seller expressly warranted that the computer and
the software constituted a turn-key system, that it was a system particularly suitable for use by
an automobile dealership, that it was adaptable to other types of businesses, and that all errors
and malfunctions would be eliminated within a specific period of time. Id.
122. Id. Among cases cited by the court for this conclusion are: Investors Premium, discussed
supra at notes 106-107 and accompanying text; APLications, Inc., discussed supra at notes
117-119 and accompanying text; and Bruffey Contracting, disccused infra at notes 129-132 and
accompanying text.
123. Investors Premium was one of the "originating cases." See supra notes 106-107 and ac-
companying text.
124. 665 S.W.2d 158 (Tex. Ct. App. 1983).
125. Id. at 160.
126. Id.
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warranties as well as to explain the resulting differences in their disclaimabil-
ity.12 7 The comments suggest that because implied warranties arise by opera-
tion of law and not by the seller's consent, the seller should fairly have the
opportunity to avoid them so long as the buyer is aware of and assents to the
elimination. The requirements of clarity and conspicuousness under section
2-316 help to establish whether the buyer had notice of, understood, and
assented to the disclaimers. On the other hand, once the seller verbalizes the
contents of an implied warranty it becomes an express warranty. Therefore,
the justification for allowing disclaimers no longer exists because these war-
ranties are no longer imposed upon the seller by law.",
Interpretative Problems Under the Narrow Express Warranty
Another type of analysis that has contributed to the conclusion that ex-
press warranties should be subject to disclaimers is viewing the warranty as a
two-step process rather than as an entity in itself. The position that the scope
of a warranty is determined by language resembling disclaimer language can
easily lead to the conclusion that a warranty can be disclaimed after its crea-
tion. However, viewing a limited warranty as an entity is in line with the
Code's analysis under section 2-316(1), which pits the entire warranty against
the disclaimer and makes the disclaimer yield.
At least one case, Bruffey Contracting Co. v. Burroughs Corp.,129 involv-
ing such extremely narrow warranties, has been noted by subsequent cases as
a precedent for the disclaimability of express warranties. It is questionable,
however, whether the court actually concluded that a disclaimer operated
against any express warranty. Rather, the court found that any express war-
ranty contained in the contract was extremely limited in scope because of a
contract clause stating: "No representation or other affirmation of fact, in-
cluding but not limited to, statements regarding capacity, suitability for use, or
performance of the equipment, shall be or be deemed to be a warranty."" 0
The net iresult was that the only express "warranty" in fact existing in the
agreement was one covering "defects in nonexpendable parts."'' The plain-
tiff lost the case because it was unable to prove that the defect occurred in
one of the few nonexpendable parts. The conclusion that an express warranty
is so narrow that it will not extend to the entire computer is quite different
127. Comment I to U.C.C. § 2-316 states: '"Implied' warranties rest so clearly on a common
factual situation or set of conditions that no particular language or action is necessary to
evidence them and they will arise in such a situation unless unmistakably negated."
128. The importance of the express warranty can also be inferred from the UCC provision
dealing with conflicting warranties, section 2-317. Under this section, except for the warranty of
fitness, the express warranty displaces the implied warranty if the two are inconsistent. The
fitness warranty arises from the conduct and communications of the parties (knowledge of
special needs plus reliance) and more closely resembles the express warranty; therefore, it is not
displaced.
129. 522 F. Supp. 769 (D. Md. 1981), aff'd, 681 F.2d 812 (4th Cir. 1982).
130. Id. at 772.
131. Id. at 774.
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from allowing a disclaimer to cancel an express warranty, even though the
result may be the same. Unfortunately, Bruffey Contracting has been cited
for the latter premise even though there is no indication that this is what the
court held.'
32
A straightforward finding of narrow warranties can circumvent the problem
of determining whether a disclaimer purporting to eliminate express warran-
ties should be allowed to do so. The problem is more likely one of proof by
the buyer that his damage resulted from a breach of warranty.
In a case involving disclaimers in four separate contracts, otherwise effec-
tive against all implied warranties, a federal court simply did not consider the
question of whether they also eliminated express warranties contained in the
contracts.' 33 The transaction involved two hardware and two software con-
tracts. The software (computer education courses and control and manage-
ment systems) was warranted to conform to "design specifications" appar-
ently outlined in the seller's manual. '3" This warranty was further limited in
scope by defining as nonconformance only those deviations from design
specifications that were "significant." The warranty in the equipment con-
tracts was limited to defects in materials and workmanship. The court de-
clined to view these warranties together to create an overall warranty to pro-
vide a functioning system, as urged by the plaintiff. Instead, the court inter-
preted the elaborate disclaimers, the narrow individual warranties, and the
limited remedies as extinguishing any claims as a matter of law, except for
whatever specific violation the plaintiff could show of the narrow express
warranties.' 3 As in Bruffey Contracting, the extremely narrow warranty
created a basic problem of proof because of the difficulty of showing that the
warranted parts were responsible for the malfunction.
In the area of narrow and specific warranties, the confusion is often a pro-
blem of terminology. In two noncomputer cases, the courts said that express
warranties could be excluded,' 36 but the statements remained mere dicta
because both courts let the express warranties stand. In both cases, however,
the courts used the terms "exclusion" or "disclaimer" for what was in real-
ity the creation of very narrow, specific, and time-limited warranties.
The Parol Evidence Restriction on the Express Warranty
Any discussion of express warranties cannot ignore the significant role of
the Code's parol or extrinsic evidence rule, which is specifically referred to in
132. Jaskey Financing, discussed supra at notes 120-123, cited Bruffey Contracting for this
conclusion.
133. Hi Neighbor Enter., Inc. v. Burroughs Corp. 492 F. Supp. 823 (N.D. Fla. 1980).
134. Id. at 825.
135. Id. at 826.
136. In McCarthy v. E.J. Korvette, Inc., 28 Md. App. 421, 347 A.2d 253, 259 (1975), the
court said there is a "right on the part of the warrantor to negate, modify or limit an express or
implied warranty." In McCulloch v. General Motors Corp., 577 F. Supp. 41, 44 (W.D. Tenn.
1982), the court said: "Express warranties may be excluded by words or conduct evidencing a
disclaimer of warranties."
1987]
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the warranty disclaimer provision of section 2-316(1). A carefully worded in-
tegration or merger clause can have the same effect as a successful disclaimer
of an express warranty.'" That is, any statements qualifying as oral warran-
ties under section 2-313 can be excluded from evidence by a typical clause
making the contract "the entire agreement of the parties" and asserting that
"there are no antecedent or extrinsic representations, warranties, or col-
lateral provisions that are not intended to be discharged.')
3
The problem is one of timing in that only prior statements are subject to
exclusion. One computer-related opinion employed a parol evidence-type
analysis to reach a determination that a disclaimer worked against prior ex-
press warranties, but not against ones given later. 139 The transaction, involv-
ing the acquisition of a computer system, progressed from a written proposal
by the seller'" to a written purchase agreement,"' ultimately culminating in a
lease. The buyer tried to exclude from evidence any reference to the purchase
contract (the second document) on the assumption that the disclaimer con-
tained in it would operate against the explicit promises contained in the pro-
posals (the first document). Even though the court incorporated the purchase
contract into the final lease agreement, it then followed the buyer's reasoning
by allowing the disclaimer to render any promises contained in the proposal
ineffective. However, it did not allow the disclaimer to operate against a
three-months' warranty contained in the purchase contract which also con-
137. See supra note 102 for a discussion of the Code's flexible parol evidence provision con-
cerning the admissibility of additional consistent terms.
138. J. WHITE & R. SUMMERS, supra note 2, § 12-4.
139. Badger Bearing Co. v. Burroughs Corp., 444 F. Supp. 919 (E.D. Wis. 1977), aff'd, 588
F.2d 838 (7th Cir. 1978).
140. The proposal summarized the performance to be rendered by the computer:
We recommend that you install a Burroughs E6000 Computer. This machine will
be used or, the applications we discussed .... These are:
Billing with Automatic Up-Dating of Accounts Receivable.
2. Inventory Up-Dating. Inventory Ledgers are updated automati-
cally through the use of punch cards ... Sales, cost and Gross Profit
by salesman [sic] by major product category are accumulated as a
by-product of updating inventory.
PERIODIC MANAGEMENT REPORTS.
3. Inventory Stock Status Report.
4. Inventory Non-Activity List.
5. Inventory Listing by product.
6. Inventory Listing by Mfg. by product.
7. Customer analysis by Salesman by Dollars by Product bought.
8. Monthly Age Analysis by Customer.
After reviewing your present system and requirements for a proposed system, we
are confident that the installation of a Burroughs E6000 Computer will afford you:
MORE WORK IN LESS TIME AND MORE MEANINGFUL MANAGEMENT
INFORMATION THAN EVER BEFORE POSSIBLE.
Id. at 920-21.
141. The purchase contract contained only a three-months warranty apparently limited to
defects and workmanship and a disclaimer of implied warranties.
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tained the disclaimer) 4 2 The court's reasoning was based on the timing of the
express warranty; that is, the disclaimer may eliminate earlier warranties but
not the ones contained in the later document. However, this reasoning is in-
consistent with Code policy, which views the time at which warranties arise
as irrelevant, so long as they are found to exist.'
4 3
Because the disclaimer provision of section 2-313(1) works in tandem with
the parol provision of section 2-202, it is often difficult to determine whether
courts exclude evidence of prior affirmations or whether they allow
disclaimers of express warranties that are part of the agreement. All of the
originating cases involved parol evidence issues.14 ' The express warranty
disclaimability phenomenon, in large measure, arises from an approach that
essentially equates an exclusion with a disclaimer. Contributing to this effect
are standard contract clauses that combine merger clauses and disclaimers in-
to one section. 4
Most cases involving warranty disputes in computer systems acquisitions
also allege fraud or misrepresentation as alternative or additional grounds for
recovery. 46 Under these tort theories, the bar of the parol evidence restric-
tion becomes irrelevant. Fraud will usually render any merger clause ineffec-
tive. However, this is generally not a reliable cause of action because many
courts will dismiss the fraud claims as being mere restatements of breach of
warranty claims.' 47 One court even allowed a preprinted merger clause to pre-
142. Id. at 922.
143. HAWKLAND, supra note 87, § 2-316:07.
144. See supra notes 104-114 and accompanying text.
145. For example, the disclaimer and merger clause in Investors Premium, 389 F. Supp. at 45,
read:
THERE ARE NO UNDERSTANDINGS, AGREEMENTS, REPRESENTA-
TIONS OR WARRANTIES, EXPRESS OR IMPLIED (INCLUDING ANY RE-
GARDING MERCHANTABILITY OR FITNESS FOR PARTICULAR PUR-
POSE) NOT SPECIFIED HEREIN, RESPECTING THIS CONTRACT OR THE
EQUIPMENT HEREUNDER. THIS CONTRACT STATES THE ENTIRE
OBLIGATION OF THE SELLER IN CONNECTION WITH THIS TRANSAC-
TION.
146. See, e.g., Consolidated Data Terminals, 708 F.2d 385 (9th Cir. 1983); Dunn Appraisal v.
Honeywell Information Sys., Inc., 687 F.2d 877 (6th Cir. 1982); Glovatorium, Inc. v. NCR
Corp., 684 F.2d 658 (9th Cir. 1982); Clements Auto Co. v. Service Bureau Corp., 444 F.2d 169
(8th Cir. 1971); Computerized Radiological Services, 595 F. Supp. 1495 (E.D.N.Y. 1984); AP-
Lications, Inc., 501 F. Supp. 129 (S.D.N.Y. 1980); Triangle Underwriters, 457 F. Supp. 765
(E.D.N.Y. 1978); Badger Bearing, 444 F. Supp. 919 (E.D. Wis. 1977); Kalil Bottling Co., 127
Ariz. 278, 619 P.2d 1055 (1980); Westfield Chem. Corp., 21 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 1293
(Mass. Dist. Ct. 1977).
147. Triangle Underwriters, 457 F. Supp. 765; Westfield Chem. Corp., 21 UCC Rep. Serv.
(Callaghan) 1293. In Computerized Radiological Services, 595 F. Supp. at 1504 n.4), the court
commented:
For reasons that are not entirely clear, there is a pronounced tendency in
computer-related litigation for plaintiffs to ignore centuries of common-law
history distinguishing contract from tort theories. A Special Committee on Com-
puters ... recently concluded:
The Committee feels that it is important to maintain the traditional
1987]
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vent a plaintiff from bringing claims in negligent misrepresentation and
fraud. " 8
While the parol evidence rule and an effective merger clause may provide a
shield for the unscrupulous seller who has "stretched the truth" during
negotiations, it is an entirely different matter for courts to sanction outright
disclaimers of express warranties. Because the parol evidence rule is designed
to protect the seller from an unscrupulous buyer who tries to get more than
he contracted for, it should not protect the seller from his own misconduct.
This reasoning explains why the parol evidence rule does not apply in cases
of fraud or misrepresentation.' 9 This rationale is also basic to section
2-316(1), which rejects disclaimers that would diminish an existing express
warranty. The disfavored behavior is that of a seller attempting to qualify his
own affirmation; the point at which this constitutes fraud is simply one of
degree and/or intent.
Of course, in practice, the rule will often protect the dishonest seller by ex-
cluding any extrinsic evidence of oral statements, but not because the courts
sanction the seller's action. The seller wins because of a determination that
the contract was complete and exclusive ("integrated").' Such a determina-
tion usually involves a factual finding that that both parties understood and
consented to the meaning of the provisions in the contract (unless
misrepresented)-an analysis that can be used under section 2-316(1) to find
that no warranties ever existed."' Without such a safeguard against false
allegations, surely the written contract would rapidly lose its significance and
binding power. Where parol evidence problems are absent, however, there is
no rational justification for protecting the seller from his own assertions or
express warranties, regardless of whether such a transaction falls under the
UCC or general contract law.
Minority View of UCC Computer Warranty Cases: Consistent With
Prior Law
The first UJCC opinion in the computer context explicitly to reject the con-
tention by sellers that disclaimers should be effective against express war-
ranties was Consolidated Data Terminals v. Applied Digital Data Systems. 2 2
In that case, a seller of computer terminals argued that the disclaimer of "ex-
press or implied warranties" should override an express warranty concerning
distinctions between the law of tort and contract. In the area of com-
mercial transactions, the bargaining principle should be controlling.
Accordingly, the Committee recommends that the courts restrict
commercial plaintiffs to their contract remedies.
148. Kalil Bottling Co., 127 Ariz. 278, 619 P.2d at 1058.
149. City Dodge, Inc. v. Gardner, 232 Ga. 766, 208 S.E.2d 794 (1974) (parol evidence rule
protects seller from allegations of false oral warranties).
150. RESTATMENT (SECOND) OF CoNTRAcrs § 212(1) (1981).
151. See supra notes 92-96 and accompanying text.
152. 708 F.2d 385 (9th Cir. 1983).
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the operating speed of a line of terminals bought by the plaintiff, itself a
distributor. Under the Code's disclaimer provision, the court found that
specific warranty language would prevail over a general disclaimer if the two
cannot be reasonably reconciled.' 53
Consolidated Data could spawn a counter-force within the computer group
of UCC warranty cases. It was cited by Computerized Radiological Services
v. Syntex Corp. for the determination that a clause attempting to disclaim
"implied" warranties did not block consideration of any express warranties
created by sales literature and oral promises made during negotiations.'5  The
court avoided any parol evidence problems by finding that proof of express
warranties was not inconsistent with a disclaimer limited to implied warran-
ties and therefore admissible into evidence.' 5 Had the disclaimer also been
directed at "express" warranties (as most standard clauses are), it is likely
that the court would have reached the same conclusion. The opinion found
extensive buyer reliance in the purchase of computerized CAT-Scan equip-
ment and interpreted section 2-316(1) as intending to protect such reliance.
Another UCC computer-related case, though theoretically accepting the
idea of express warranty disclaimability, sensed that there was a difference in
disclaiming implied and express warranties." 6 The court concluded that any
doubt regarding the disclaimer of an express warranty should be resolved in
favor of the affirmative warranty.
Relation of Express Warranty to Other UCC Provisions
As can be seen from the preceding discussion, express warranties and their
relative disclaimability are closely intertwined with concepts expressed in
other Code provisions, as well as with some areas not specifically embodied
in the Code, such as common law fraud actions.
On a practical level, express warranty litigation not only raises the core
issue of the existence of an express warranty as defined by the Code, but a
host of other relevant Code provisions that can cause the same outcome as an
effective warranty disclaimer. The buyer will have to contend with additional
seller defenses or his own failure to perform. In the end the express warranty
may become irrelevant to a successful recovery. These other obstacles facing
computer vendees in a suit for defective systems which prevent recovery in-
clude:
153. Id. at 392.
154. 595 F. Supp. 1495 (E.D.N.Y. 1984).
155. Id. at 1507.
156. In W.R. Weaver Co. v. Burroughs Corp., 580 S.W.2d 76, 81 (Tex. Ct. App. 1979), the
court stated:
At this stage, at least, the inconsistent language of the instruments, creating an ex-
press warranty [that the systems analysis would completely define vendee's ac-
counting needs and design a working system to meet plaintiff's requirements] while
at the same time disclaiming the warranty, creates a question of fact as to the in-
tention of the parties.
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1. seller's valid limitation of remedies,"'
2. limitation of consequential damages,'58
3. buyer's failure to effectively reject defective goods,1
4. buyer's failure to particularize the specific defects as the basis for re-
jection,"0
5. buyer's acceptance of the goods,"'
6. wrongful or ineffective revocation of acceptance, 62 and
7. the shortening of the statute of limitations.
63
The seller's limitation of remedy and the limitation on consequential
damages are conceptually distinct from disclaiming warranties. Nevertheless,
one UCC computer-related case relied on section 2-719 for its ruling that an
express warranty could be effectively disclaimed under section 2-316(1).
6 4
The confusion arises because both provisions can reduce the seller's liability
exposure.
Allowing disclaimers of implied warranties or creating a narrow express
warranty limit the seller's exposure by decreasing the number of circum-
stances in which he is in breach of contract. Consequently, the potential
number of causes of action are reduced. Limiting the available remedy or
placing a ceiling on the amount of damages merely decreases the seller's
remedial obligation once he has breached the contract. 16 Thus, even if the
buyer can prove that a breach has occurred, a limited remedy or a limitation
on consequential damages may provide the same result as if no warranty ex-
isted.
As is typical under the UCC, most of the above-listed provisions can be
changed by agreement. This, however, is little consolation to an individual
consumer or a small business acquiring computers from dealers who neither
give their own warranty nor add to the manufacturer's warranty. In those
cases there is little room for bargaining. The evolving nature of the computer
has rapidly changed the background of the transaction. So far, most of the
157. U.C.C. § 2-719 (1982) allows the seller to provide for an exclusive remedy unless such
remedy fails of its essential purpose.
158. Id. § 2-719(3) allows the seller to limit or exclude liability for consequential damages
unless such limitation is unconscionable.
159. Id. § 2-602 requires the buyer to reject goods within a reasonable time and to notify the
seller.
160. Id. § 2-605.
161. Id. § 2-606 provides that the buyer is deemed to have "accepted" the goods under certain
circumstances or by certain conduct.
162. Id. § 2-608 provides that the buyer may revoke his acceptance if there is a "substantial"
impairment to the value of the contract. However, revocation must take place within a
reasonable time of discovery of the defect; the seller must be notified; and revocation must take
place before the value of the goods deteriorates.
163. Id. § 2-725 provides for a four-year statute of limitations, which can be shortened by
agreement to not less than a year.
164. See supra note 118.
165. Murray v. Holiday Rambler, Inc., 83 Wis. 2d 406, 265 N.W.2d 513 (1978).
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reported UCC cases involve large businesses individually contracting with the
original manufacturer, a situation well within the contemplation of the UCC.
Conclusion
It is entirely possible that courts in the early computer cases were biased in
favor of the seller because the industry was in its infancy. This situation can
produce a conscious or unconscious desire to ease some litigation burdens. If
so, this reason for helping the seller by allowing disclaimers of express war-
ranties is no longer valid, particularly in view of the many other Code
defenses available to the seller and his ability to limit his remedial obligations
or his liability for consequential damages.
66
From a policy standpoint, permitting disclaimers of express warranties is
likewise questionable because such a rule allows sellers to escape the conse-
quences of their own business conduct and condones misrepresentation. To
some extent, a seller already can avoid liability for his own statements that
do not rise to the level of fraud by using an effectively worded merger clause
to keep prior representations from being incorporated into the agreement.
This is an unfortunate, albeit unavoidable, by-product of the parol evidence
bar whose purpose is to protect the "real bargain" by excluding false allega-
tions of additional promises. Where express warranties are part of the
bargain and otherwise enforceable, it hardly makes sense to render them in-
operative by disclaimer.
Computer transactions generally present no difficulties as far as applica-
tion of article 2 is concerned. Particularly in the realm of express warranties,
the issue of where on the services/goods or tangible/intangible spectrum the
transaction lies becomes irrelevant because the seller himself has provided the
measure for contract performance. In the computer context, performance is
measureable; moreover, results are predictable and can be duplicated
reliably. It is ironic that the Code which, in contrast to common law,
liberalized the creation and scope of warranties in favor of the buyer should
now be read by courts to allow the giving and simultaneous withdrawing of
an affirmative promise." 7
The close interrelation between Code concepts has proven to be conducive
to confusion in terminology, and related concepts then tend to lose their
subtle distinctions. The disclaimability of express warranties in great measure
resulted from a disregard of the distinction between creating express and im-
plied warranties and the consequent different disclaimer rules.' 8 Cases ex-
cluding evidence of express warranties under the parol evidence bar have
been used as a basis for concluding that express warranties may be dis-
claimed."16 Even the limitation of remedies provision has been equated with a
disclaimer of express warranties.' 70
166. See supra notes 157-165 and accompanying text.
167. Note, supra note 19, 59 WASH. L. REv. at 526.
168. See supra note 46 and accompanying text.
169. See notes 116-126 and accompanying text.
170. See note 119 and accompanying text.
1987]
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On the other hand, the same interrelation of concepts which can lead to
confusion also gives the Code its sense of unity and internal consistency.
Supplemented by the overall emphasis on commercial reasonableness, trade
practices, and good faith, the specific provision rendering inconsistent
disclaimers of express warranties inoperative should be liberally construed in
favor of the warranty. A seller seeking to disclaim his own affirmations
rather than standing behind them is hardly acting in good faith.
Viewed in this light, attempted disclaimers of express warranties should be
critically examined. Because computer warranty litigation is bound to con-
tinue and increase, the likelihood that the disclaimability of the express war-
ranty will spill over into noncomputer cases becomes correspondingly
greater. Courts should seriously question the precedential value of computer-
related cases that leave specific and affirmative promises at the mercy of
general disclaimer provisions found in standardized contracts.
Barbara Chretien-Dar
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/olr/vol40/iss3/17
